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Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in
which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize
a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is
flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and
the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy).
Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for
social mobilization or multi-level marketing.
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1 Introduction
Agents often organize themselves into hierarchies when involved in joint ventures (e.g., Mookher-
jee, 2006). There exist numerous reasons to explain this fact. The hierarchical form, in which
workers deal with the routine problems and managers deal with the exceptions, arises as an
optimal way to structure the organization of knowledge (e.g., Garicano, 2000). Ownership or
power structures generate natural hierarchies with related chains of command and responsibil-
ity (e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). It is also argued that workplace structures that are rich
in sequentiality are desirable from the point of view of incentives (e.g., Winter, 2010). Fur-
thermore, hierarchies yield stable cooperation structures when it comes to allocating resources
(e.g., Demange, 2004). Hierarchies may also relate to crowdsourcing and social mobilization
systems (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), as well as multi-level marketing (e.g., Emek et al., 2011),
task solving systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., Rand, 2012), or financial systems
such as BitCoin (Babaioff et al. 2012).
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of sharing the collective proceeds generated
from hierarchical ventures. To analyze this problem, we consider a stylized model in which a
group of agents are involved in a joint venture. The group is structured in layers, each reflecting
a different degree of responsibility, command, or even seniority. Thus, an agent located at a
given layer is in command of (or, at least, held accountable for) all agents located at any lower
layer. In such a hierarchy, agents are characterized by their degree of responsibility (location
in the hierarchy), and the individual revenue they produce for the joint venture. Based on
that information, the issue is how to allocate the overall produced revenue among the agents.
Our stylized model is flexible enough to accommodate various forms of organizations that
are frequent in different professional sectors. Instances are law firms (e.g., Galanter and Palay,
1990), physicians’ practices (e.g., Kletke et al., 1996) as well as renowned architectural practices
(e.g., Winch and Schneider, 1993).
Two focal, and somewhat polar, allocation rules can be considered for the setting described
above. On the one hand, the no-transfer rule, in which each agent keeps her revenue (thus,
ignoring the hierarchy). On the other hand, the full-transfer rule, in which the agent at the top
of the hierarchy gets all the proceeds (thus, ignoring individual contributions). A compromise
between these two polar rules, in which certain upward transfers are allowed, can be formalized,
and we do so in this paper. The resulting family of geometric rules is close in spirit to the MIT
strategy (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), the winning strategy for the so-called DARPA Network
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Challenge.1 It is also reminiscent of multi-level marketing strategies (e.g., Emek et al., 2011)
in which individuals are compensated not only for the sales they generate, but also for the
sales of those they recruited.2 These strategies can be seen as specific geometric (incentive
tree) mechanisms (e.g., Lv and Moscibroda, 2013) that are usually considered in the computer
science literature.3 An incentive tree models the participation of people in crowdsourcing or
human tasking systems. An incentive tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how
much each individual participant shall receive based on all the participants’ contributions, as
well as the structure of the solicitation tree. In geometric incentive tree mechanisms, a certain
fraction α ‘bubbles up’ from one agent to the immediate superior, a fraction α2 bubbles up
to the immediate superior of the immediate superior, and so forth. In our case, a geometric
rule states that the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ of her revenue, her immediate superior
gets a share λ of her revenue, and of any remaining ‘surplus’ from the lowest-ranked agent,
etc. Thus, there is an obvious connection between the geometric rules we consider here and
geometric incentive tree mechanisms. It is worth emphasizing, nevertheless, that the latter are
typically not budget balanced and, thus, cannot be considered as sharing rules.
We provide normative foundations for the family of geometric rules described above. In the
benchmark case of linear hierarchies, we show that the family is characterized by four simple
and intuitive axioms (Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence, Highest
Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Scale Invariance). If we add an additional axiom, referring
to two-agent problems in which the highest-ranked agent is not productive, the intermediate
geometric rule for which λ = 0.5 is singled out within the family. If, instead, axioms modeling
order preservation (with respect to either individual revenues, or hierarchy positions) are added,
the two polar rules are obtained.
The member of the family arising when λ = 0.5, which translates to our context the MIT
strategy mentioned above, is also singled out as an optimal rule, when we enrich our framework
to deal with endogenous hierarchies. More precisely, suppose the aim is to maximize the
expected revenues of the agent at the top of the hierarchy (the highest-ranked agent), when the
1This is a social network mobilization experiment, conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, to identify distributed mobilization strategies and demonstrate how quickly a challenging geolocation
problem could be solved by crowdsourcing.
2Famous cases include companies such as Avon Products, Inc., or Herbalife International.
3Computer scientists have been concerned with mechanisms that are immune to sybil attacks in which a
reputation system is subverted by forging identities in peer-to-peer networks (e.g., Drucker and Fleischer, 2012).
This is actually a type of manipulation to which the mechanism arising from the MIT strategy is susceptible.
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process to get subordinates is probabilistic and based on the upward transfers the rules allow.
The highest-ranked agent, while selecting a geometric rule, would face a tradeoff: high upward
transfers vs. weak incentives for subordinates to join the hierarchy voluntarily. We show that
the optimal rule to deal with such a tradeoff is precisely the intermediate geometric rule for
which λ = 0.5. This occurs, not only when (possible) subordinates are myopic, but also when
they are farsighted and take into account their ability to hire further subordinates themselves.
Our contribution is also related to the sizable literature on fair division in networks. This
literature mostly organizes itself into two strands.
On the one hand, the strand in which the networks give rise to cooperative games and
where the structure of the network is exploited in order to define fair allocation among agents
connected in the graph. The canonical case is that of cost sharing within a rooted tree, which
can be traced back to Claus and Kleitman (1973) and Bird (1976). For fixed trees, the so-called
Bird rule, which can be seen as a counterpart to the no-transfer rule, and the so-called serial
rules, which convey a different form of transfers to the ones described above, are prominent.
This is, for instance, the case in the problem of sharing a polluted river (e.g., Ni and Wang, 2007;
Dong et al., 2012) which is reminiscent of the problem considered here (with the modification of
considering negative revenues, and thus interpreting them as costs). Another specific (and well-
known) instance of this strand of the literature is the so-called airport problem (e.g., Littlechild
and Owen, 1973), in which the runway cost has to be shared among different types of airplanes
with a linear graph representing the runway. The rules (and some of the axioms) highlighted
in our work will also be reminiscent of some of the rules considered for airport problems.
A common feature for the models within this strand of the literature is that the cheapest
connection (minimal distance) to the root becomes a crucial parameter, as it represents the
stand-alone option for the agents. This is not the case in our model, where the crucial feature
is the combination of the agents’ revenues and the position in the hierarchy. Consequently,
stand-alone options are not naturally specified.
Another strand of the literature considers networks that restrict cooperation. Myerson
(1977, 1980) pioneered this approach by using graphs to represent communication structures
in cooperative games. A central result within this approach is that if agents are allowed to
cooperate in tree structures, the original TU-game need only be superadditive to guarantee that
the graph-restricted game has a non-empty core (e.g., Le Breton et al., 1992, Demange, 1994).
In particular, our analysis can be related to the case of TU-games restricted by a permission
structure (e.g., Gilles et al., 1992, van den Brink and Gilles, 1996), precedence structure (e.g.,
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Faigle and Kern, 1992, Grabisch and Sudho¨lter, 2016) or peer groups (e.g., Branzei et al., 2002).
For instance, if hierarchies are interpreted as permission structures, and these are restricting a
predefined additive game where the worth of a coalition equals the sum of revenues for agents
in that coalition, our revenue sharing problem can be construed as a game with permission
structure (Gilles et al., 1992) where agents need permission from all their superiors before they
can cooperate (the conjunctive approach). For such restricted games, a generalization of the
Shapley value, dubbed the permission value (characterized in van den Brink and Gilles, 1996,
and van den Brink, 1997), coincides with the serial rule on our models for linear and branch
hierarchies. In other words, it shares the revenue of each agent equally among this agent and
all of her superiors. As we shall see later, this is a radically different solution from the family
of geometric rules presented here.
It is important to stress that, in our model, there is no predefined cooperative game where
the hierarchies are restricting cooperation. Instead, we relate fairness requirements directly to
the hierarchical network structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the basic model in
which the hierarchy can be expressed as a line. We introduce and characterize our family of
geometric rules for such a setting. We also consider a setting of endogenous hierarchies, which
allows us to link further the geometric rules to incentive tree mechanisms, as well as to single
out the intermediate rule of the family as optimal. In Section 3, we generalize the analysis
to the case of branch hierarchies (not necessarily linear) and show how the results from the
linear case generalize to such a setting with minimal adjustments. In Section 4, we extend the
analysis further to account for general hierarchies. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Linear hierarchies
We present in this section our benchmark model dealing with linear hierarchies. Suppose there
exists a set of potential agents, identified with the set of natural numbers. Let M be the
class of finite subsets of the natural numbers, with generic element M . Each set M ∈ M will
represent a linear hierarchy, with the convention that lower numbers in M refer to lower
positions in the hierarchy. For instance, if M = {1, . . . ,m}, then 1 is representing the agent
with the lowest rank in the hierarchy, whereas m is representing the agent with the highest
rank.
Agents in each linear hierarchy will be involved in a joint venture to which all of them
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contribute. Formally, for each i ∈ M , let ri ∈ R+ be the revenue that agent i generates,
and r = (ri)i∈M the profile of revenues.4 We assume the hierarchical structure is a chain of
command in the sense that every agent i refers to her direct superior in the hierarchy.
A linear hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a problem is a duplet consisting of
a linear hierarchy M ∈ M and a profile of revenues r ∈ R|M |+ . Let RM be the set of problems
involving the hierarchy M and R = ⋃M∈MRM .
Given a problem (M, r) ∈ R, an allocation is a vector x ∈ R|M |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈M xi =
∑
i∈M ri.
An allocation rule is a mapping φ assigning to each problem (M, r) ∈ R an allocation
φ(M, r). We assume from the outset that rules are anonymous, i.e., for each problem (M, r) ∈
R, and for each strictly monotonic function g : M → M ′, φg(i)(M ′, r′) = φi(M, r), where
r′g(i) = ri, for each i ∈ M . Thus, in what follows for this section, we assume, without loss of
generality, that M = {1, . . . ,m}.
2.1 Geometric rules
Two (polar) examples of rules are those capturing the minimal and maximal possible revenue
transfers from subordinates to their superiors in the hierarchy.
More precisely, for the first one, each agent in the hierarchy transfers nothing to her supe-
riors. Formally,
No-Transfer rule, NT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
NT (M, r) = r.
For the second one, the highest-ranked agent receives all revenues. Formally,
Full-Transfer rule, FT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
FT (M, r) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
∑
i∈M
ri
)
.
Between the two rules, a vast number of rules can be imagined. Instead of endorsing a
specific rule directly, we take an axiomatic approach and propose first several axioms reflecting
principles that we find normatively appealing in the context of these problems.
We start with the principle of consistency, an operational notion that has played an instru-
mental role in axiomatic analyses of diverse problems, and for which normative underpinnings
4For each M ∈M, each S ⊆M , and each z ∈ Rm, let zS = (zi)i∈S . For each i ∈M , let z−i = zM\{i}.
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have also been provided (e.g., Thomson, 2012). Here we concentrate on a minimalistic version
of the principle referring only to the case in which the agent with the lowest rank leaves the
hierarchy after the allocation took place. It seems natural to assume that the lowest-ranked
agent refers to his immediate superior in the linear hierarchy to terminate his relationship.
Thus, we assume that, after leaving, a new problem arises in which the agent with the second-
lowest rank in the original problem becomes the lowest-ranked agent, but now also generating
the eventual revenue that the leaving agent generated in the original problem, and did not take
in the allocation. The axiom then states that the solution of the new problem agrees with the
solution of the original problem for all the standing agents in the hierarchy.5 Formally,
Lowest Rank Consistency: For |M | ≥ 2, where (M, r) ∈ R, and (M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 −
φ1(M, r), rM\{1,2})) ∈ R, we have,
φM\{1}(M, r) = φ
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − φ1(M, r), rM\{1,2})
)
.
The next two properties focus on the opposite end of the hierarchy. As we imagine that the
highest-ranked agent can monitor and veto changes in generation of revenue and changes in the
hierarchy we need conditions that protect the subordinates from changes and manipulation of
revenues beyond their control.
The first one says that the size of the revenue generated by the highest-ranked agent is
irrelevant for the assignments to the subordinates: A plausible rationale for this axiom is that,
in a linear hierarchy, subordinates have no influence on the revenue generated by the highest-
ranked agent and, thus, should not be affected by its size. Formally,
Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each rˆm ∈ R+,
φM\{m}(M, r) = φM\{m} (M, (r−m, rˆm)) .
The second one avoids certain strategic manipulations by the highest-ranked agent. More
precisely, it says that if the highest-ranked agent splits her revenue into two amounts, repre-
sented by two agents ranked highest in the new hierarchy, the remaining agents should not be
affected.6 Formally,
5This axiom is actually reminiscent of the so-called “first agent consistency” axiom proposed by Potters and
Sudho¨lter (1999) for airport problems.
6Axioms of this sort have been widely explored in various models of resource allocation (e.g., Ju, 2013).
Note that our axiom only requires “splitting-proofness” in a specific situation, which makes it weaker than the
standard counterpart axioms in such a literature.
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Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (M, r) ∈ R, let (M ′, r′) ∈ R be such that
M ′ = M ∪ {k}, k > m, rm = r′k + r′m, and r′M\{m} = rM\{m}. Then,
φM\{m}(M ′, r′) = φM\{m} (M, r) .
In a sense, the previous two axioms convey certain rights and obligations for the highest-
ranked agent, as well as for the remaining members of the hierarchy. On the one hand, Highest
Rank Revenue Independence says that the highest-ranked agent is entitled to the entire revenue
she generated, whereas the remaining agents must respect that. On the other hand, Highest
Rank Splitting Neutrality says that the highest-ranked agent is entitled to bring a newcomer to
the top of the hierarchy with whom to split her revenue, but the remaining agents are entitled
to preserve their allocations intact after such a move.
Finally, we consider a property stating that if revenues are scaled by a factor α, so is the
solution.7
Scale Invariance: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each α > 0,
φ(M,αr) = αφ(M, r).
The no-transfer rule and the full-transfer rule presented above satisfy the previous four
axioms. Both rules are extreme in an obvious sense, which suggests that the set of all rules
satisfying the axioms should consist of those resulting from a compromise between them. It
turns out that this compromise can be described as follows:
Suppose the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ ∈ [0, 1] of her revenue, her immediate
superior gets a share λ of her revenue, as well as any ‘surplus’ from the lowest-ranked agent,
etc., and the highest-ranked agent gets the residual. Hence, if M = {1, . . . ,m}, payment shares
are determined recursively as
xλi = λri + (1− λ)xλi−1, (1)
for each i ∈M \ {m}, with the notational convention that xλ0 = 0. Furthermore,
xλm =
m∑
i=1
ri −
m−1∑
i=1
xλi . (2)
Note that (1) and (2) can be given the closed-form expressions
xλi = λ
(
ri + (1− λ)ri−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)i−1r1
)
,
7This axiom appears frequently in axiomatic studies (e.g., Aumann and Serrano, 2008).
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for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and
xλm = rm + (1− λ)rm−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)m−1r1.
Denote the corresponding family of rules so defined, which we call geometric rules, by
{φλ}λ∈[0,1]. Note that φ1 corresponds to the no-transfer rule, whereas φ0 corresponds to the
full-transfer rule.
Example 1: Consider the problem ({1, 2, 3}, (12, 6, 12)), i.e., the linear hierarchy made of three
agents, 1, 2, and 3, in which agent 1 generates a revenue of 12, agent 2 a revenue of 6, and
agent 3 a revenue of 12. Figure 1 below illustrates the situation.
6
12
2
3
121
?
?
Figure 1: A linear hierarchy.
It is straightforward to see that the no-transfer rule selects the allocation (12, 6, 12), whereas
the full-transfer rule selects the allocation (0, 0, 30). In general, the geometric rules select the
allocation
(12λ, (18− 12λ)λ, 30(1− λ) + 12λ2),
for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, for λ = 0.5, the corresponding geometric rule selects the
allocation (6, 6, 18). Thus, in such a case, agent 2 receives the same amount as agent 1, despite
the fact that agent 1 is generating twice the revenue.
When agents generate equal revenues, the geometric rules can be fully ranked by means of
the Lorenz criterion %L, according to the parameter describing the family.8 More precisely, for
8Given two vectors, we say that the former Lorenz dominates the latter if its smallest coordinate is at least
as large as the smallest coordinate of the second vector, the sum of its two smallest coordinates is at least as
large as the corresponding sum for the second vector, and so on.
9
each (M, r) ∈ R, such that ri = rj for each pair i, j ∈ N , it follows that φλ(M, r) %L φλ′(M, r)
if and only if λ ≥ λ′.
Our main result, stated next, shows that the family of geometric rules is characterized by
the combination of the axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Scale Invariance if and only if it is a geometric rule,
i.e., φ ∈ {φλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the geometric rules satisfy all the axioms in the state-
ment of the theorem. As an illustration, we show that they satisfy lowest rank consistency.
To do so, let λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let (M, r) ∈ R. For each i ∈ M , let xi = φλi (M, r) and x˜i =
φλi
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − x1, rM\{1,2})
)
. Then, x˜2 = λ(r2 + r1 − x1) = x2. For each j 6= m,
x˜j = λrj + (1−λ)x˜j−1. Thus, by induction, x˜j = xj and x˜m = rm + rm−1−x1−
∑n−1
k=2 x˜k = xm.
Now, let φ be a rule satisfying all the axioms in the statement of the theorem. First, let
M = {1} and r = r1. By balance, φ1(M, r) = r1 = φλ1(M, r), for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. Next, add
a superior agent 2 with revenue r2. Let M
′ = {1, 2} and r′ = (r1, r2). Now we claim that
φ1(M
′, r′) ∈ [0, r1], so φ1(M ′, r′) = λr1 = φλ1(M ′, r′) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, assume that
φ1(M
′, r′) > r1; then by highest rank revenue independence φ1(M ′, r′) = φ1(M ′, (r′1, 0)) so by
balance φ1(M
′, r′) ≤ r1 - a contradiction.
By highest rank revenue independence, λ is independent of r2. Moreover, λ is independent
of r1. To see this, suppose, by contradiction, that we have r˜ = (r˜1, r˜2) with r2 = r˜2 and
φ1(M
′, r′) = λr1 and φ1(M ′, r˜) = λ˜r˜1 with λ 6= λ˜. Then, by Scale Invariance, φ1(M ′, r˜1r1 r) =
r˜1
r1
λr1 = λr˜1 6= λ˜r˜1, contradicting our previous conclusion that λ is independent of r2. Now, by
balance, φ2(M
′, r′) = r2 − r1 − φ1(M ′, r′) = φλ2(M ′, r′).
Next, suppose there is λ such that φ = φλ for all problems with up to k agents, k ≥ 2.
Now, consider the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k} and rk = (r1, . . . , rk) and add
an agent k + 1. By highest rank revenue independence, and highest rank splitting neutrality,
φi(M
k+1, rk+1) = φi(M
k, rk) = φλi (M
k, rk) for all i ≤ k − 1. By lowest rank consistency,
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φk(M
k+1\{1}, rk+12 +rk+11 −φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2}). As, by the induction
hypothesis, φ1(M
k+1, rk+1) = φλ1(M
k, rk) = λr1, it follows by lowest rank consistency that
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φλk(M
k+1, rk+1). Finally, by balance,
φk+1(M
k+1, rk+1) = rk+1 −
k∑
i=1
φλi (M
k+1, rk+1) = φλk+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
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The axioms of Theorem 1 are logically independent:
• The classical serial rule (e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1992) states that each agent’s revenue
is split equally among her superiors and herself. In Example 1, it would yield the allo-
cation (4, 7, 19). The serial rule violates highest rank splitting neutrality, but satisfies the
remaining axioms in Theorem 1.
• Another natural rule is the one in which all agents keep a fraction λ of their own revenue
and the highest-ranked agent receives the residual. In Example 1, it would yield the
allocation (6, 3, 21), for the case with λ = 0.5. This rule violates lowest rank consistency,
but satisfies the remaining axioms in Theorem 1.
• Consider the rule in which agents from the bottom of the hierarchy keep their revenues,
provided these are not higher than the aggregate revenue of their superiors. As soon
as there is an agent with a higher revenue than the aggregate revenue of her superiors
the rule states this agent, and all her superiors, should transfer their revenues to the
highest-ranked agent. This rule violates highest rank revenue independence, but satisfies
the remaining axioms in Theorem 1.
• Finally, consider the rule in which agents from the bottom of the hierarchy keep their
revenues, provided these are not higher than 1. As soon as there is an agent with a higher
revenue than 1, the rule states this agent, and all her superiors, should transfer their
revenues to the highest-ranked agent. This rule violates scale invariance, but satisfies the
remaining axioms in Theorem 1.
In what follows, we complement the above characterization by adding several new axioms,
which will single out focal members of our family.
We start with an axiom referring to canonical two-agent problems in which the highest-
ranked agent is not productive. For those settings, one might find appealing to allocate revenues
equally. A plausible rationale is that, although the lowest-ranked agent is the only productive
one, the highest-ranked agent is also necessary for production to take place. Formally,9
Canonical Fairness: For each x ∈ R+, φ({1, 2}, (x, 0)) = (x2 , x2 ).
9In two-player games with permission structures (e.g., van den Brink and Gilles, 1996), canonical fairness
would follow from the combination of the so-called structural monotonicity axiom and the necessary player
property.
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The geometric rule for which λ = 0.5 is the only geometric rule satisfying this axiom. In
fact, and as shown by the next result, the rule is characterized when replacing scale invariance
in Theorem 1 by this new axiom.10
Theorem 2 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Canonical Fairness if and only if it is the intermediate
geometric rule for which λ = 0.5, i.e., φ ≡ φ0.5.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we know that φ0.5 satisfies the first three axioms of the theorem. It
is straightforward to see that it also satisfies canonical fairness. Conversely, let φ be a rule
satisfying the axioms of the theorem. First, let M = {1, 2} and r = (r1, r2). By highest rank
revenue independence, φ1(M, r) = φ1(M, (r1, 0)). By canonical fairness, φ1(M, (r1, 0)) =
r1
2
.
Then, by balance, φ(M, r) = ( r1
2
, r2 +
r1
2
) = φ0.5(M, r).
Next, suppose that φ ≡ φ0.5 for all problems with up to k agents, k ≥ 2. Now, consider
the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k} and rk = {r1, . . . , rk} and add an agent k + 1.
By highest rank revenue independence, and highest rank splitting neutrality, φi(M
k+1, rk+1) =
φi(M
k, rk) = φ0.5i (M
k, rk) for all i ≤ k − 1. By lowest rank consistency, φk(Mk+1, rk+1) =
φk(M
k+1 \{1}, rk+12 + rk+11 −φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2}) and thus, by the induction hypothesis,
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k (M
k+1, rk+1). Finally, by balance,
φk+1(M
k+1, rk+1) = rk+1 −
k∑
i=1
φ0.5i (M
k+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
The rule φ0.5 satisfies a stronger version of canonical fairness, which indicates that in a
hierarchy in which only the lowest-ranked agent is productive, each agent gets one half of
the incoming revenue and transfers the remainder. More precisely, if the revenue of the lowest-
ranked agent is x, this agent keeps x/2, her immediate superior gets x/4, the immediate superior
to the latter gets x/8, etc. This is precisely the rationale behind the so-called MIT strategy,
which is described in more detail below.
We now consider two new axioms formalizing two polar forms of order preservation.
The first axiom states that agents producing higher revenues should be awarded more. The
second states that agents located higher in the hierarchy should be awarded more. Formally,
10If instead of canonical fairness, one considers the axiom stating that those (canonical) two-agent problems
are solved in a specific (inegalitarian) way, say (λx, (1−λ)x), then the corresponding geometric rule (φλ) would
be characterized.
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Revenue Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair i, j ∈ M such that
ri ≥ rj, φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).
Hierarchical Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair i, j ∈ M , where
i ≥ j, φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).11
The full-transfer rule is the only geometric rule satisfying the first axiom, whereas the no-
transfer rule is the only geometric rule satisfying the second axiom. More interestingly, and
as shown by the next result, each of the rules is characterized by the corresponding axiom, in
combination with either highest rank splitting neutrality or highest rank revenue independence.
Theorem 3 The following statements hold:
• A rule satisfies Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Revenue Order Preservation if
and only if it is the no-transfer rule.
• A rule satisfies Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality and Hierarchical Order Preservation if
and only if it is the full-transfer rule.
Proof: We concentrate on the non-trivial implication of each statement. First, let φ be a rule
satisfying highest rank revenue independence and revenue order preservation. Let (M, r) ∈ R
be given. We claim first that
∑m−1
j=1 φj(M, r) ≤
∑m−1
j=1 rj. By contradiction, assume other-
wise. Then, by highest rank revenue independence we can vary rm without affecting the shares
of the other agents (i = 1, . . . ,m − 1). Thus, let rm = 0, which contradicts balance. As∑m−1
j=1 φj(M, r) ≤
∑m−1
j=1 rj, balance implies that φm(M, r) ≥ rm. Now, for each i 6= m letting
rm = ri we get, by revenue order preservation, that φi(M, r) = φm(M, r) ≥ ri. Now, balance
gives φi(M, r) = ri for all i ∈M .
Now, let φ be a rule satisfying highest rank splitting neutrality and hierarchical order preser-
vation. By contradiction, suppose that there exists a problem (M, r) ∈ R and an agent i 6= m,
such that φi(M, r) =  > 0. Let (M
′, r′) be defined by setting M ′ = {1, . . . ,m+ x}, r′i = ri for
all i < m, and
∑m+x
j=m r
′
j = rm. By highest rank splitting neutrality φi(M
′, r′) = φi(M, r) for all
i < m. Now, choose x >
∑m+x
j=1 φj(M
′,r′)

. By hierarchical order preservation, φj(M
′, r′) ≥  for
all j = m, . . . ,m+ x, which contradicts balance.
11Hierarchical order preservation corresponds to structural monotonicity when applied to additive games with
a linear permission structure (e.g., van den Brink and Gilles, 1996).
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2.2 Optimal geometric rules
Our approach so far has been entirely normative. We singled out the parametric family of
geometric rules satisfying compelling incentive and fairness constraints. Now, let us assume
that the highest-ranked agent has the power to implement a member of this family, and the
question is which one would maximize the highest-ranked agent’s payoff. It is clear that, for a
given fixed hierarchy, the highest-ranked agent will maximize her payoff by choosing the full-
transfer rule. However, a full-transfer rule provides no incentive to join the hierarchy in the first
place. So, what if the highest-ranked agent starts on her own and needs to build a hierarchy
from the start? It is natural to expect that the probability of recruiting a (revenue-generating)
subordinate is connected to her potential earnings.
A dilemma thus emerges: a geometric rule associated with a low λ yields a high upward
transfer, but also reduces the subordinates’ (expected) payoff and, thus, the incentive to join
the hierarchy voluntarily. We aim to address such a dilemma in this subsection. For ease of
exposition, we assume in what follows that all revenues are normalized to unity.
One approach is to assume that agents are somewhat myopic, which would translate into
stating that the probability of getting a subordinate is equal to λ itself. Another approach is to
assume that subordinates are farsighted, which would imply that they take into account their
ability to hire further subordinates from whom revenues will bubble up. In this latter case, the
probability of getting a subordinate would be represented by the payoff of the subordinate. In
what follows, we analyze both cases.
We first consider the case in which λ is the probability that any agent in the hierarchy gets
a subordinate. That is, if the highest-ranked agent selects the full-transfer rule, the probability
of having agents to join the hierarchy as subordinates is 0, as all their revenues are transferred
to the highest-ranked agent. Likewise, using the no-transfer rule the probability is 1, as agents
keep their own revenue. In general, using a geometric rule, the highest-ranked agent’ expected
revenue is given by
∞∑
t=0
(1− λ)t.
Now, if the highest-ranked agent aims to maximize total revenue in expected terms, when λ
denotes the probability that an agent within a linear hierarchy gets a subordinate, the following
problem should be solved:
max
λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)λ)t.
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It is straightforward to see that the last problem is equivalent to the following one:
max
λ
(1− λ)λ,
with solution λ = 0.5.
As an illustration, note that the expected transfer from subordinates to the highest-ranked
agent at (optimal) λ = 0.5 is
∑∞
t=1(1/4)
t = 1/3.
We now assume that (possible) subordinates are farsighted and, thus, take into account
their ability to hire further subordinates (once in the hierarchy) from whom revenues would
bubble up.
Let δ denote the probability of getting a subordinate. In this (farsighted) case, the highest-
ranked agent would solve the problem
sup
λ,δ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t, (3)
under the constraint that the probability δ equals the payoff of any non-highest-ranked agent,
δ = λ+ λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t. (4)
It is not difficult to show that the only two possible solutions of (4) are δ = 1 and λ > 0, or
δ = λ
1−λ .
In the former case it is therefore profit maximizing for the highest-ranked agent to set λ as
close as possible to 0. In the latter case, it follows that (3) is solved when λ = 0.5 and δ = 1.
As shown above, λ = 0.5 crops up in different settings of endogenous hierarchies as the
optimal parameter choice for the highest-ranked agent. Thus, the geometric rule with λ = 0.5
has a close relation to the so-called MIT strategy (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), a specific mechanism
for solving a task via linear recruitment graphs. More precisely, suppose solving the task
amounts to a benefit of B dollars. Then, the MIT strategy states the following payment scheme:
the agent who solves the task keeps B/2, then her recruiter gets B/4, the recruiter’s recruiter
gets B/8, and, so forth.12 Such a strategy corresponds exactly to the geometric rule with
λ = 0.5, in a situation where the revenue of the lowest-ranked agent is B and all other agents
have revenue 0, provided the highest-ranked agent gets to keep the residual (due to the balance
condition of our rules).
12Note that this mechanism is never in deficit, i.e., the residual from B, after obeying this payment scheme,
is always non-negative.
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3 Branch hierarchies
In this section, we extend the linear-hierarchy case considered above to account for branch hier-
archies, i.e., situations in which a given agent can have more than one immediate subordinate.
We represent a branch hierarchy as a graph where each agent is connected to the (unique)
highest-ranked agent via a unique rank path consisting of all her superiors (see Figure 2).
A branch hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a b-problem is a triple (N, r, s),
where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a revenue profile specifying the revenue of each
agent in N , and s is a function mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate superior agent
j = s(i) (with the convention that s(i) = ∅ if i is the highest-ranked agent), such that the
graph induced by s has no cycles.13 Let B denote the set of b-problems.
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Figure 2: A branch hierarchy. This figure illustrates a branch hierarchy involving five agents, with agent
5 denoting the highest-ranked agent, agents 3 and 4 her direct subordinates and agents 1 and 2 being the
subordinates of agent 4. Each of the two agents at the bottom generate a revenue of 1. Agent 3 yields a revenue
of 16, whereas agent 4 yields a revenue of 6. Finally, agent 5 yields a revenue of 10. In summary, the hierarchy
so illustrated is (N, r, s) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (1, 1, 16, 6, 10), s), where s(1) = s(2) = 4, s(3) = s(4) = 5 and s(5) = ∅.
Given a b-problem (N, r, s), a b-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ri. A b-allocation rule is a mapping β assigning to each problem (N, r, s)
13Note the deliberate change in notation from M (in the linear case) to N , as “places” in the hierarchy do
not make sense for non-linear hierarchies.
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an allocation β(N, r, s) = x. We also require, as in the linear case, that rules be anonymous,
i.e., for each bijective function g : N → N ′, βg(i)(N ′, r′, s′) = βi(N, r, s), where r′g(i) = ri, and
s′(g(i)) = g(s(i)) for each i ∈ N .
The geometric rules have a simple generalization to branch hierarchies. Formally, let i be
an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in the tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
Her immediate superior k = s(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k=s(j)
(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of b-allocation rules by {βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Our axioms for the linear hierarchy model also have a natural extension to the branch
hierarchy model. Formally,
b-Lowest Rank Consistency: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, with |N | ≥ 2, and each i ∈ N without
subordinates, such that (N \ {i}, (rs(i) + ri − βi(N, r, s), rN\{i,s(i)}), sN\{i}) ∈ B,14
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = β
(
N \ {i}, (rs(i) + ri − βi(N, r, s), rN\{i,s(i)}), sN\{i}
)
.
b-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, each i ∈ N such that
s(i) = ∅, and each rˆi ∈ R+
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = βN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), s) .
b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each i ∈ N such that
s(i) = ∅, let (N ′, r′, s′), be such that N ′ = N ∪ {k}, s′(i) = k, s = s′ otherwise, ri = r′k + r′i,
and r′N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
βN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, s′) = βN\{i} (N, r, s) .
b-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each α > 0,
β(N,αr, s) = αβ(N, r, s).
14By sN\{i} we denote the restriction of the function s to the domain N \ {i}.
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With these extended axioms in place we obtain a counterpart of Theorem 1 for branch
hierarchies.15
Theorem 4 A b-rule β satisfies b-Lowest Rank Consistency, b-Highest Rank Revenue Inde-
pendence, b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and b-Scale Invariance if and only if it is a b-
geometric rule, i.e., β ∈ {βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the b-geometric rules satisfy all the axioms of the theorem.
Conversely, let β be a rule satisfying these axioms. Let (N, r, s) ∈ B. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: (N, r, s) is a linear hierarchy.
In this case, the branch hierarchy (N, r, s) ∈ B consists of a line, and thus we use the
abbreviated notation (N, r) ∈ R. Then, by Theorem 1, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that
β(N, r) = βλ(N, r).
Case 2: (N, r, s) is not a linear hierarchy.
Let i denote an agent without subordinates in the branch hierarchy (N, r, s). Then, xi =
βi(N, r, s) = δri for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
Iteratively, we can apply b-lowest rank consistency to all agents not located on the direct
path of superiors from i to the highest-ranked agent, in order to reduce the branch hierarchy
to a line. For each iteration, the payment is unchanged for agent i and we end up with a linear
hierarchy. It then follows from Case 1 that δ = λ.
The previous argument can be repeated for any agent without subordinates, which shows
that δ is not agent-specific. Thus, xj = β
λ
j (N, r, s), for each agent j without subordinates.
Now, consider an agent h who is the immediate superior of an agent without subordinates.
By b-lowest rank consistency, for each subordinate of h, we obtain a new problem in which
agent h has no subordinates, and in which the revenue of agent h corresponds to her original
revenue, plus the surplus from all the subordinates of h. Applying the same argument as above,
it follows that xh = β
λ
h(N, r, s). The proof easily concludes from here.
4 General hierarchies
An important limitation of the previous analysis is that hierarchies contain a single highest-
ranked agent. It is often the case that a given agent has more than one superior, in which case
15Note that adding canonical fairness to the current characterization singles out the intermediate geometric
rule for which λ = 0.5.
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we talk about general hierarchies. For instance, two firms may jointly own an entity on an
equal partnership basis and that entity may again own other entities, either alone or as joint
ventures. Similarly, for social mobilization schemes, an agent may be approached by several
recruiters and may solve tasks for all of them. The aim of this section is to extend the previous
analysis to account for the case of general hierarchies. As we shall see, a generalized version of
our family of geometric rules will also arise in this setting.
A general hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a g-problem is a triple (N, r, S),
where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a revenue profile specifying the revenue of each
agent in N , and S is a correspondence mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate superiors
S(i) ⊂ N (with the convention that S(i) = ∅ if i is a highest-ranked agent), such that the
graph induced by S is connected and cycle free.16 Let G denote the set of g-problems.
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Figure 3: A general hierarchy. This figure illustrates a general hierarchy involving six agents, with agents 5
and 6 denoting the highest-ranked agentes, agent 4 being direct subordinate of both, agent 3 direct subordinate
of 5, and agents 1 and 2 being the subordinates of agent 4. Each of the two agents at the bottom generate
a revenue of 1. Agent 4 yields a revenue of 16, whereas agent 3 yields a revenue of 6. Finally, agent 5 yields
a revenue of 10, and agent 6 yields a revenue of 9. In summary, the problem so illustrated is (N, r, S) =
({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, (1, 1, 16, 5, 9, 10), S), where S(1) = S(2) = {4}, S(3) = {5}, S(4) = {5, 6} and S(5) = S(6) = ∅.
16We consider cycles in the undirected sense. More precisely, a situation such as S(1) = {2, 3}, S(2) =
{3}, S(3) = ∅ is considered a cycle and, thus, we exclude it from our analysis.
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Note that, as the graph induced by S has no cycles, deleting any link ij leads to two
components of such a graph, dubbed the i- and the j-component, and denoted by Giij and G
j
ij
respectively.
Given a g-problem (N, r, S), a g-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ri.
A g-allocation rule is a mapping γ assigning to each problem (N, r, S) an allocation
γ(N, r, S) = x. We also impose from the outset, as in the linear case, that rules are anonymous,
i.e., for each bijective function g : N → N ′, γg(i)(N ′, r′, S ′) = γi(N, r, S), where, for each i ∈ N ,
r′g(i) = ri, and S
′(g(i)) = g(S(i)) = {g(s) : s ∈ S(i)}. Our family of geometric rules generalizes
easily to the general hierarchy setting by transferring an equal split of the accumulated surplus
of a given agent i to each of her immediate superiors.
Formally, let i be an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in the tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
Each of her immediate superiors k ∈ S(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k∈S(j)
1
|S(j)|(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of g-allocation rules by {γλ}λ∈[0,1].
Three of our axioms from the linear hierarchy model have a natural extension to the general
hierarchy model. Formally,
g-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, S) ∈ G, each i ∈ N such that
S(i) = ∅, and each rˆi ∈ R+,
γN\{i}(N, r, S) = γN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), S) .
g-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, S) ∈ G and each i ∈ N such that
S(i) = ∅, let (N ′, r′, S ′), be such that N ′ = N ∪{k}, S ′(i) = {k}, S ′ = S otherwise, ri = r′k+r′i,
and r′N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
γN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, S ′) = γN\{i} (N, r, S) .
g-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, S) ∈ G, and each α > 0,
γ(N,αr, S) = αγ(N, r, S).
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The fact that a general hierarchy might involve several highest-ranked agentes, as well as
several superiors for the lowest ranked agents, calls for adjustments of the remaining axioms,
as well as for new axioms.
We first strengthen lowest rank consistency. To do so, consider an agent i and one of
her immediate subordinates j. It seems normatively appealing to state that deleting the j-
component, and transferring any surplus from that component to i, should leave the payoffs of
all agents in the i-component unchanged. Formally,
Component Consistency: For each (N, r, S) ∈ G, and each pair i, j ∈ N such that i ∈ S(j),
let
• N ′ = Giij,
• r′i = ri +
∑
k∈Gjij(rk − γk(N, r, S)),
• r′h = rh for each h ∈ Giij \ {i},
• S ′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ Giij.
Then, (N ′, r′, S ′) ∈ G and, for each h ∈ N ′,
γh(N
′, r′, S ′) = γh(N, r, S).
Clearly, component consistency implies lowest rank consistency, as the j-component may
consist of agent j alone.
The following axiom is new. It refers to the case in which a given agent has several superiors
who are not superiors for any other agents. In such situations, merging the superiors will not
change the payoff of the remaining agents. Formally,
Top Merger: For each (N, r, S) ∈ G and each j ∈ N such that |S(j)| ≥ 2, S(k) = ∅ for each
k ∈ S(j), and S(h) ∩ S(j) = ∅, for each h ∈ N \ {j}, let (N ′, r′, S ′) ∈ G be such that
• N ′ = (N \ S(j)) ∪ {k′},
• r′k′ =
∑
k∈S(j) rk, and r
′
h = rh for each h ∈ N \ S(j),
• S ′(k′) = ∅, S ′(j) = k′, and S ′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ N \ (S(j) ∪ {j}).
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Then, for each h ∈ N \ S(j),
γh(N
′, r′, S ′) = γh(N, r, S).
We are now ready to extend Theorem 1 to general hierarchy problems.17
Theorem 5 A g-rule γ satisfies g-Highest Rank Revenue Independence, g-Highest Rank Split-
ting Neutrality, g-Scale Invariance, Component Consistency, and Top Merger if and only if it
is a g-geometric rule, i.e., γ ∈ {γλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the g-geometric rules satisfy all the axioms of the theorem.
Conversely, let γ be a rule satisfying these axioms. We prove this implication by induction.
First, by Theorem 1, there exists λ such that γ = γλ for two-agent problems. Suppose there
is λ such that γ = γλ for all problems with up to k ≥ 2 agents and consider the subfamily of
problems with k + 1 agents. Let (N, r, S) ∈ G be one of those problems and let i ∈ N be such
that S−1(i) = ∅. We now claim that γi(N, r, S) = λri. Indeed, by repeated use of component
consistency, we can construct a new problem for which all other agents (different from i) have
a unique linear path to i, such that i’s payoff is unchanged. Now, by repeated use of top merger
and g-highest rank splitting neutrality, we obtain a new (two-agent) problem for which agent i
gets γi(N, r, S) = λri.
Now, let j ∈ S(i). We claim that ∑h∈Gjij γh(N, r, S) = ∑h∈Gjij rh + (1−λ)ri|S(i)| . Indeed, by
repeated use of component consistency, top merger and g-highest rank splitting neutrality we
can reduce the j-components to a single agent, where this agent receives the same payoff as
the entire j-component did before. By g-highest rank revenue independence and anonymity of
γ the claim follows.
Consequently,
∑
h∈Giij γh(N, r, S) =
∑
h∈Giij γ
λ
h(N, r, S).
Now, for a given j ∈ S(i), by component consistency we can add the surplus of the i-
component, i.e.,
∑
h∈Giij(rh − γh(N, r, S)), to j and then eliminate the i-component. By our
induction hypothesis, the payoff of an arbitrary agent h ∈ Gjij is γh(N, r, S) = γλh(N, r, S),
which concludes the proof.
17Note that adding canonical fairness to the current characterization singles out the intermediate geometric
rule for which λ = 0.5.
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5 Conclusion
Priorities among agents is a compelling way to express asymmetric rights. We have dealt
in this paper with a resource allocation problem arising when every agent is arranged in a
priority structure and generates a collective profit. More precisely, we have considered a stylized
model in which participating agents, who are hierarchically organized, contribute with (possibly
different) individual revenues to the collective proceeds. The canonical application of our model
is the case of multi-level marketing. Another interesting application is the allocation of profit
in companies, as our model is flexible enough to accommodate several forms of professional
organizations and practices in real life.
We have introduced a family of allocation rules for our model, ranging from the rule ignoring
the command structure conveyed by the hierarchy, to the rule ignoring individual contributions
to the joint proceeds. The rules are members of a one-parameter family with an interesting
economic interpretation as a compromise between those two polar rules, allowing for certain
upward transfers in the command structure.
The intermediate member of our family, obtained when the compromise between the polar
rules is balanced, is a translation to our context of the so-called MIT strategy, a popular
mechanism for social mobilization. We also show that the rule is optimal, within our family,
if the aim is to maximize the expected revenues of the agent at the top of the hierarchy, and
the process to get subordinates is probabilistic. In general, the rules within our family also
exemplify usual practices in multi-level marketing, the marketing approach in which buyers are
encouraged to take an active role in promoting the product (offering them rewards for successful
direct or indirect referrals of the product to other prospective buyers). Our results, therefore,
provide normative foundations for such a type of strategies, formalizing the idea of ‘bubbling
up’ revenues along the hierarchy.
Our analysis not only involves the benchmark case of linear hierarchies, but also more
general hierarchical structures. Thereby, our results also provide new insights in the field of
fair allocation in networks.
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